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This paper addresses ontology and ethics of an AI agent called digital me. We define digital me as 
autonomous, decision-making, and learning agent, representing an individual and having practically 
immortal own life. It is assumed that digital me is equipped with the big-five personality model, ensuring 
that it provides a model of some aspects of a strong AI: consciousness, free will, and intentionality. As 
computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans, digital me can 
judge the personality of the individual represented by the digital me, other individuals’ personalities, 
and other digital me-s. We describe seven ontological qualities of digital me: a) double-layer status of 
Digital Being versus digital me, b) digital me versus real me, c) mind-digital me and body-digital me, d) 
digital me versus doppelganger (shadow digital me), e) non-human time concept, f) social quality, g) 
practical immortality. We argue that with the advancement of AI’s sciences and technologies, there exist 
two digital me thresholds. The first threshold defines digital me having some (rudimentarily) form of 
consciousness, free will, and intentionality. The second threshold assumes that digital me is equipped 
with moral learning capabilities, implying that, in principle, digital me could develop their own ethics 
which significantly differs from human’s understanding of ethics. Finally we discuss the implications of 
digital me metaethics, normative and applied ethics, the implementation of the Golden Rule in digital 
me-s, and we suggest two sets of normative principles for digital me: consequentialist and duty based 
digital me principles.  
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1. Introduction    
 
The games of chess, shogi and Go as well as Atari video games are typical domains for measuring the 
advancements of artificial intelligence (AI).  Recently, in 2019, the algorithm MuZero has been 
introduced (Schrittwieser, Antonoglou, Hubert, Simonyan, Sifre, Schmitt 2019) that achieves state-of-
the-art performance when playing Atari games and superhuman performance in precision planning 
tasks in chess, shogi and Go. The algorithm, most importantly, does not require any knowledge of the 
game rules or environment dynamics. Thus, for example, when evaluated on Go, chess, and shogi, 
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without any knowledge of the game rules, MuZero matched the superhuman performance of other 
algorithms, including AlphaZero (Silver, Hubert, Schrittwieser, Antonoglou, Lai, Guez 2018), for which 
the game rues are provided.  In 1997, IBM’s chess-playing program, Deep Blue, beat the reigning human 
world champion, Garry Kasparov, in a six-game match. Comparing the AlphaZero’s game of chess with 
Deep Blue, Strogatz wrote: “For better and worse, it (Deep Blue) played like a machine, brutally and 
materialistically. It could out-compute Mr. Kasparov, but it couldn’t outthink him”. However, he further 
emphasized: “Most unnerving was that AlphaZero seemed to express insight. It played like no computer 
ever has, intuitively and beautifully, with a romantic, attacking style” (Strogatz 2018).  
  
Not only games, but AI agents – autonomous, decision-making, and self-evolving machines – are 
becoming part of our everyday life. In 2020, the concept `digital me` has been included in the Gartner’s 
Five Emerging Trends That Will Drive Technology Innovation for the Next Decade (Gartner 2020). In the 
few studies, however, the term `digital me` represents only data: a personal electronic archive, a 
personal data storage system, a massive digital footprint, and a digitization of individual level biomedical 
data (Burrows 2006, Sjoberg et al. 2017, Okun and Wicks 2018). As AI methods are advancing and 
pervasive records of digital footprints, including Facebook profiles and/or mobile device activities, are 
used to infer individuals’ personality, the concept `digital me` is expected further to be developed as AI 
agent, making the cyber (digital) world and the physical world even more integrated, thus, effectively 
blurring the gap between the two.  
 
We define digital me is an autonomous, decision-making, and self-evolving (learning) agent, 
representing an individual. We stress that, in this paper, agent means an entity capable of performing 
actions, so that, for example, a collection of data does not constitute an agent, but, however, a machine 
or a software program playing chess is an agent. Digital me provides a model of person representing the 
individual and constitutes her/his “Avatar”. Digital versions of ourselves (digital twins) are not only our 
data (collected by others) but models, digital mirrors of our facets and personalities, that represent 
humans in both the real (physical) and virtual (digital) worlds. The interaction of humans in the digital 
and real worlds, through digital tweens, is bidirectional, and could be implemented with wearables 
and/or implants that monitor brain electrical activities and mental states of individuals. Moreover, we 
define digital me as an agent which provides models of some aspects of a strong AI: consciousness, self-
awareness, sentience, and sapience. More precisely, we assume that digital me is equipped with the big-
five model (Kosinski, Stillwell, Graepel, 2013) that measures traits of openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. As computer-based personality judgments are more 
accurate than those made by humans (Youyou, Kosinski, Stillwell 2015), this model is used to judge the 
personality of the individual represented by the digital me as well as other individuals’ personalities, and 
even other digital me-s. Others’ personalities can also be predicted, for example, from patterns of 
behavior collected with smartphones (Stachl et al. 2020). In fact, “individuals’ personality dimensions 
(assessed at broad domain and narrow facet levels) can be predicted from six classes of behavior: 1) 
communication and social behavior, 2) music consumption, 3) app usage, 4) mobility, 5) overall phone 
activity, and 6) day- and night-time activity, in a large sample” (Stachl et al. 2020). We also assume that 
digital me is equipped with state-of-the-art model-based reinforcement learning algorithms as well as 
algorithms providing decision-making and planning capabilities. 
 
Digital me could be considered, to some extent, as (practically) immortal entity for three reasons. By 
“digital me immortality” in this paper we qualify any agent which excels the average life expectancy of 
humans at least by twice. It means that while digital me agents have a finite number of years, their 
longevity considerably surpasses humans’ biological years. For example, digital me models of a deceased 
person, based on data from their existing/shadow social networks profiles (also, of digital me-s creating 
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their own shadow digital me-s), are surpassing any known biological duration of humans. The three 
stated reasons for claiming their practical immortality are the following. First, International Data 
Corporation, in a recent forecast (Reinsel and Rydning, 2020), estimates that the installed base of 
storage capacity worldwide will grow to 6.8 zettabytes (ZB) this year, an increase of 16.6% over 2019. 
Although the amount of data generated, consumed, and transferred is huge and crucial for deployment 
of machine learning techniques in AI, there is no need for all generated data to be stored. On the other 
hand, data needed to build psychological profiles that represent adults is, to some extent, small. For 
example, regarding the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal, “Cambridge Analytica says it has as 
many as 3,000 to 5,000 data points on each of us, be it voting histories or full-spectrum demographics — 
age, income, debt, hobbies, criminal histories, purchase histories, religious leanings, health concerns, 
gun ownership, car ownership, homeownership — from consumer-data giants” (McKenzie 2016). 
Therefore, digital me models of each person could be, in principal, stored for a long period. Second, 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a regulation in EU law that became enforceable on May 
25, 2018. It provides a comprehensive data protection framework, including one of its innovative 
concepts: right to erasure (`right to be forgotten'). However, discussing the ``technical problems faced 
when adhering to strict interpretation of data deletion requirements under the Right to be Forgotten’’, 
Villaronga, Kieseberg, and Li conclude that ``it may be impossible to fulfill the legal aims of the Right to 
be Forgotten in artificial intelligence environments’’ (Villaronga, Kieseberg, and Li 2018). Finally, third, at 
more fundamental level, in the quantum world, the concept of conservation of quantum information 
has been proven theoretically (Braunstein and Pati 2007) and demonstrated experimentally (Samal, Pati, 
and Kumar 2011), which implies that quantum information cannot be destroyed.  
 
As digital me is defined as autonomous, decision-making, and learning agent, representing an individual 
and having practically immortal own life, the central philosophical problem to be addressed in this paper 
is its ontology and ethics. The paper is structured into three main sections: Digital me ontology, Machine 
ethics, and Digital me Ethics. Section 2 Digital me ontology addresses seven ontological qualities of 
digital me: a) double-layer status of Digital Being versus digital me, b) digital me versus real me, c) mind-
digital me and body-digital me, d) digital me versus doppelganger (shadow digital me), e) non-human 
time concept, f) social quality, g) practical immortality. In the Section 3 Machine ethics, we provide brief 
overview of machine ethics as well as of the fields of moral cognition and moral learning. Finally, in the 
Section 4 Digital me Ethics, we argue that as AI is advancing, there exist two digital me thresholds 
representing a single individual. The first threshold defines digital me having some (rudimentarily) form 
of consciousness, free will, and intentionality. The second threshold assumes that digital me is already 
equipped with moral learning capabilities, implying that, in principle, digital me could develop their own 
ethics which significantly differs from human’s understanding of ethics. Finally we discuss the 
implications of digital me metaethics, normative and applied ethics, the implementation of the Golden 
Rule in digital me-s, and we suggest two sets of normative principles for digital me: consequentialist and 
duty based digital me principles. 
 
2. Digital me ontology  
 
Before addressing digital me ontology, we briefly discuss the digital ontology as a field of study. Zuse, 
acknowledged by many as the father of digital ontology, suggests that (so called Zuse Thesis): “the 
universe is being deterministically computed on some sort of giant but discrete computer” (Zuse, 1967, 
1969, 1993). Wheeler proposes the so-called “It from bit” doctrine, according to which information is 
the core of the universe (Wheeler 1990). Every “it”, whether a particle or field of force, even the space-
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time continuum itself - derives its existence, function and meaning from the binary choices, from bits.“ 
Fredkin stresses that “digital ontology is based on two concepts: bits, like the binary digits in a computer 
correspond to the most microscopic representation of state information; and the temporal evolution of 
state is a digital informational process similar to what goes on in the circuitry of a computer processor.” 
(Fredkin 2003). However, Floridi (Floridi 2009) argues that digital ontology should be carefully 
distinguished from informational ontology, which is, from his point of view, a promising line of research. 
Discussion about digital vs. analogue, which is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational 
paradigm, is beyond the scope of the paper. Both, digital and analogue, according to Floridi, “are only 
“modes of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced 
and/or conceptualized by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction” (Floridi 2009).   
 
We stress that, at the fundamental (physics) level, energy, matter, and information are all tightly 
connected.  A common or traditional definition of matter is "anything that has mass and volume 
(occupies space)". In physics, mass and energy are related quantities, in a system’s rest frame, the 
values of the mass and energy differ only by a constant and the units of measurement. Moreover, in a 
recent nano-scale experiment, demonstration of the conversion of information to energy has been 
provided, suggesting a new fundamental principle of an ‘information-to-heat engine’ that converts 
information into energy by feedback control (Toyabe et al. 2010). By the laws of physics, the fact that 
information can be converted to energy, and energy is related to its mass, leads to the conclusion that 
information forms an ontological entity, an entity with ontological status.  
 
The branch of philosophy that defines concepts of existence, being and reality on the most fundamental 
level is called ontology (from the Greek: onto “being” and logos “logical discourse”). According to 
Aristotle, ontology is defined as the science of being qua being, and its two most common questions 
throughout history are: “What is being?” and “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (Feltham 
and Clemens 2004). Two fundamental problems of ontology are the problem of identity (the mind-body 
problem), and the problem of agency (free will versus determinism).  
 
In modern ontology, a set of negative definitions are used to delimit the ontology of the subject: it 
cannot be theorized as the self-identifying agent, it is not a product of self-reflection, and it cannot 
correlate to an object (Badiou 2004). In short, modern ontology blurs the distinction between the being 
of the subject and the being of everything else, which makes it less anthropocentric ontology. Post-
structuralists (some works and some periods of Derrida, Foucault, Badiou, Lacan), mostly agree that “the 
subject has no substantial identity”, and “the illusion of an underlying identity is produced by the very 
representational mechanism employed by the subject in its efforts to grasp its own identity” (Badiou 
2004). For the first problem of identity, it means that the question of identity is moved from the mind-
body paradigm into the realm of the text, thus into recalling the early ontological claim: There is no 
outside-text. If there is no outside-text, and the subject does not have a definable identity, how to 
answer the first ontological problem (that of identity) and how to differentiate between one subject and 
another, or between one subject and its “digital me”? The second problem, the problem of agency (free 
will versus determinism) is connected to the previous predicament: if there is no self-identifying subject, 
then how it interacts within the chain of actions? Some thinkers displace the problem of agency from 
the level of humans to the level of beings. It is not how humans interact within the chain of actions, 
since they also emerge in the course of such a chain of actions (by being born, for example), but how 
this identity which has an agency (either as having a free will, or as an entity subjected to determinism), 
emerges into being. This then brings the question of agency to the ancient ontological question, “How 




One solution to this dilemma is offered in Heidegger, who formulates the difference between Being and 
beings (the concept of “Being” and the concept of “individual beings”). The second term “individual 
beings” refers to humans in temporal and historical terms, to the fact that “they are”, humans are 
embedded and located in the physical, material world. The first term “Being” (Sein) cannot exist without 
these “individual beings” who exist in the world, who have historicity, and whom Heidegger called 
“being-there” (Dasein). The “Being” itself is not historical, it is an abstract concept and it is dislocated 
from the world, and this dislocation is our constitutive, primordial condition. In his book Being and Time 
Heidegger writes: “Being determines entities as entities” but “the Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an 
entity” (Heidegger 1962). His answer to the first ontological problem (that of identity) is solved by 
differentiating between two levels: one is the level of historicity, where the “individual beings” exist, 
where they are, and the second level is the level of “Being”, which itself is a-historical and abstract. 
Regarding the second ontological problem (that of agency), human beings are being thrown into a 
deterministic world/situation, they do exist, but their existence is a material “example” of the concept of 
Being (which is why they are called “Being-there”), they as human beings are the embodiment of the 
Being itself, and are determined by this a-historical “Being”.  
 
Heidegger’s difference between Being and beings resembles the old ontology theory by Plato, for whom 
the physical world is not the “real “world, it just seems to be real and true.2 What is real are the 
“concepts”, which Plato called ideas (“eidos”). These “eidos” are unchangeable, absolute and true, and 
they are the real reality. “Eidos” have no physical essence, they are forms, or models, and they have real 
ontology, while the objects, including humans, which appear in our reality are just mere imitations of 
the forms (“eidos”). The world and its objects, including humans, are just imitations and illusions of 
these real realities, of the “eidos”.  
 
In the following seven points, by applying this dual, double-layer ontological structure, we will portray 
the ontological status of digital me: 
 
1. Two ontological concepts. Following Heidegger, we consider two main concepts: Digital Being (with 
capital and bold D) and digital being, which here also stands as synonym for “digital me”.  Our 
standpoint is, paraphrasing Heidegger, that “digital world” signifies the totality of digital beings which 
can be present within the “digital universe.” Digital being (or digital me) refers to those digital entities 
(beings) that can ask questions regarding the nature of Digital Being.  In general terms, digital world 
consists of various (both physical and digital) entities – from hardware, digital electronics, to digital 
software, digital information, to digital collective societies – it is digital beings (digital me-s) alone who 
are able to encounter, to some extent (to be discussed in the next section) the question of what it 
means to be. Digital Being (with capital D), an abstract and dislocated from the (digital and physical) 
world, and digital me-s, material examples of Digital Being in the digital world, embodiments of Digital 
Being me. Thus, Digital Being me is the prerequisite for the existence of the concrete digital-me.  
 
2. Digital me (digital being) versus real me (being). In Plato the actual living individual is conceptualized 
as a mirror, or an imitation of the ideal “Eidos”. The concept digital me is not such mirror of “real” me, 
as it is understood in Plato, in the sense that the real me is not perceived as “ideal”, just as digital me is 
not a full “mirror” of real me. In Heidegger, “Being” is the prerequisite for the existence of the individual 
 
2 The long tradition of various philosophical interpretations of the works of Heidegger, of the works of Plato, as 
well as their possible connections and differences, remains out of the scope of this paper. 
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being, the “Being” determines that she or he actually exists. Again, this is not the case with digital me, 
where the real me does not fully determine the existence of digital me – real me gives data for the 
formation of digital me, but real me does not fully correspond to its digital me. The concept Digital me 
guarantees the consistency and existence of digital me in the digital world, so that digital me acquires a 
life of its own. In fact, for a single person, a single “real me”, we associate a series of digital me-s as 
discussed in the subsection 4.1.   
 
Although partly formed out of data of the living or deceased person, digital me does not represent a 
mirror abstract structure of a real person. The data is deployed by individuals (alive or deceased) either 
by posting information about themselves or others: biographies, photos, affiliations, opinions, everyday 
activities, families, friends, locations, work, portfolios, etc., or it consists of data collected by others. This 
data then forms a Digital me as an abstract concept and a series of digital me-s as models of real me in 
such a way that both the Digital me and the series of digital-me-s do not effectively serve as a “digital 
tween” for the “real me”. Each Digital me is a singular unity in the strict sense, to an extend 
independent from the “model” which it is based upon.  
 
3. Mind-digital me and Body-digital me. Each digital me consists of a model that integrates both mental 
and physical properties of a person. Therefore, the model consists of two parts: mind-digital me 
(modeling mental properties of the person) and body-digital me (modeling her/his physical properties). 
Humans have both physical properties and mental properties. The mental properties are typically 
conceived to be different from the physical properties. The mental and physical realms are not identical, 
and, for many researchers, the mental cannot be not reduced to the physical, yet they interact with 
each other. Many debates on the mind-body interactions are centered around the question whether the 
mental realm is reducible to the physical, claiming that all mental processes could be, in principle, 
explained using basic sciences of biology, neuroscience, and physics. According to Pernu two out of five 
mental most prominent characteristics are consciousness (perceptual experience, emotional experience, 
and much more) and intentionality (beliefs, desires, and so on) (Pernu 2017). 
 
The digital mind-body problem (for both Digital me and digital me-s) concerns the relationship between 
these two entities modeling (mind and body) properties. The digital mind-body problem breaks down 
into a number of components (see Robinson 2020) for the mind-body problem:  
 
• The ontological question: what are digital mental states, what are digital physical states and are 
they related to each other?  
• The causal question: do digital mental/physical states influence physical/mental states, and if so, 
how?  
• The problem of consciousness: does digital-consciousness exist, and if so, how is it related to 
mind-digital me and the body-digital me? 
• The problem of the self: does digital-self exist, and if so, how is it related to mind-digital me and 
the body-digital me?  
 
The digital mind-body problem, however, is out of scope of the paper and will be discussed elsewhere.  
 
4. Digital me versus doppelganger. Although one of the most recurring themes regarding the digital 
entities in scientific and popular literature is that of the doppelganger (a double of a living person), 
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digital me is not a doppelganger of the living person, although it is based on that identity, or is a scratch 
of such entity. To extend it can be conceptualized as an ontological “shadow”, but one which is not a 
double understood as a fully hypothetical me, nor is an exact “copy” of a real me, although it is partly 
formed out of the data of real me. We stress that both physical and mental properties of a person 
evolve in time and one should consider (both deterministic and stochastic) dynamical models that 
describe time-evolution of a person’s physical and mental states and corresponding properties. For such 
dynamical models, evolving digital me-s even further diverge from real me (in the case of deterministic 
models also as a consequence of the sensitivity of the initial conditions). Again, this is beyond the scope 
of the paper and will be treated separately.   
 
5. The temporality (time) of Digital me. Digital me has a specific status regarding what is traditionally 
perceived as “human time”. We argue that digital me does not have an a priori existence - something 
which exists “prior” me as a human-model, or that I am formed from such a model, as in Plato’s “Eidos”, 
or as in Heidegger’s “Being”. Nor digital me exists a posteriori, in what we traditionally understand as 
someone or something who represents my “successor”. We argue that digital me represents a separate 
temporal entity, which does not have a traditional concept of human time attached to it. We shall 
discuss this in extenso in other occasions. 
 
6. The Social quality of digital me. Digital me has a social quality. It interacts with at least 3 other 
instances: the physical me, another digital me-s, and other physical me-s. The activities of the digital me 
affect the “real me” (Heidegger’s “Being-There”), and vice versa, my real me interferes with my digital 
me, blurring the gap between the two. The interaction of humans and their digital me-s is bidirectional. 
Because of the social qualities, digital me-s can be conceptualized as entities capable of forming 
communities. Those communities can be formed among the digital me-s, or between the digital me-s 
and the real me-s. It effectively means new forms of social and political unities, and presupposes the 
need for consequent political and social orders, contracts, new forms of egalitarian maxims, and 
protection of peace, stability and sustainability.  Because they are stored and collected, although 
autonomous and with a potential to learn and make decisions, digital me-s have vulnerability of being 
manipulated, used, misused or otherwise manufactured, generated, fabricated or constructed. These 
actions can be performed by actual me-s, by digital me-s themselves, or by the hybrids of both.  
 
7. Immortality. Digital me has a practically immortal entity, which gives them a new ontological status 
regarding the central ontological questions of death, finitude, religion, the question of origins and God, 
and the metaphysis.  
 
Because of the above mentioned ontological qualities of digital me (double-layer status Digital Being 
versus digital beings/digital me, model arranged of mind-digital me and body-digital me, non-human 
time concept, capacity for building social relations and communities, bidirectional relations, and 
practical immortality), in this paper we are proposing the need for defining the digital me as a separate 
autonomous ethical entity with its ethical rights and duties, and with the need for a comprehensive 





3. Machine ethics  
 
In the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the field of machine ethics, defined as the 
discipline “concerned with the consequences of machine behavior towards human users and other 
machines” (Anderson and Anderson 2007). One of the central philosophical topics (subjects, themes) in 
machine ethics is the debate on "artificial moral agents and/or patients", those artificial entities (such as 
computers, robots, or even computer programs, software agents) capable (being able) to do wrong (to 
harm, to hurt, to insulate) and, therefore, possibly be considered responsible for such behavior, and/or 
capable of being harmed (hurt, insulted, wronged). Moor although does not actually define what an 
(ethical) agent (or patient) is, considers four different levels of ethical agents (Moor 2006): ethical-
impact agents and implicit ethical agents (both levels without any ethics explicitly implemented in their 
software), explicit ethical agents (with normative ethical premises directly implemented in their 
programming or reasoning process), and fully ethical agents (humans are so far the only agents 
considered to be full ethical agents, partially because they have consciousness, free will, and 
intentionality). 
 
The central question, dominating the field of machine ethics, is: What are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an artificial entity to be a moral agent/patient? Scholars (philosophers) have addressed 
this question by focusing on two opposite concepts: the standard concept and the functionalist concept. 
The standard concept assumes that a moral agent should encounter three conditions:  rationality, free 
will or autonomy, and phenomenal consciousness conditions. According to Johnson (Johnson 2006), (see 
also Behdadi and Munthe 2020), a moral agent should have an internal state, consisting of its own 
desires, beliefs and other intentional states that together comprise a reason to act in a certain way 
(rationality and consciousness). Artificial entities, therefore, are not moral agents since they do not have 
the internal mental states. Moreover, although artificial agents could behave as resembling human 
action, these behaviors can never confer moral qualities to these entities, due to the absence of these 
internal mental states13. The functionalist concept of moral agency, suggested by Floridi and Sanders, 
accepts a ‘mind-less morality’ (Floridi and Sanders 2004) and, by considering high level of abstraction, 
maintains consistency and relevant similarity concerning the underlying structural features of 
paradigmatic human moral agents. Floridi and Sanders (2004) offer three conditions for moral agency: 
(1) interactivity meaning that the agent interacts with its environment); (2) independence (or autonomy) 
implying that the agent has an ability to change itself and its interactions independently of immediate 
external influence; and (3) adaptability stressing that the agent  may change the way in which the 
independence is achieved based on the interactions with environment. The literature on this (central) 
question and related topics relevant for moral agency such as phenomenal consciousness or subjective 
mental states, rationality, moral competence, free will, autonomy, and moral responsibility has been 
exponentially growing. However, all these topics are beyond the scope of the paper, see for example, 
(Coeckelbergh 2020, Formosa & Ryan 2020, van de Poel 2020, Behdadi & Munthe 2020, Swanepoel 
2020, Mabaso, 2020). For a recent review on artificial moral agents, we refer the reader to (Cervantes, 
López, Rodríguez, Cervantes, Cervantes, & Ramos 2020).  
 
 
The field of moral cognition is developing rapidly. According to Cohen Priva and Austerweil 2015 (Cohen 
Priva and Austerweil 2015), Greene (Greene 2015), and Cushman, Kumar, and Railton (Cushman, Kumar 
and Railton 2017), a single journal, the journal Cognition, has shown an exponential growth in the field 
of moral cognition. For example, several topics were addressed in Cognition, including, see references in 
Greene (Greene 2015), free will and moral responsibility, moral dilemmas, ‘‘moral luck’’, the Knobe 
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effect, and the nature of the moral self. Moreover, in the last decade, psychologists have studied the 
cognitive and affective mechanisms responsible for moral judgment and behavior, resulting in improved 
understanding of psychological mechanisms and their neural basis used to make moral judgments and 
behaviors, and much more. Blair (2017) provides experimental evidence that important components of 
moral development and moral judgment rely on two forms of emotional learning: stimulus-
reinforcement and response-outcome learning (Blair 2017). Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 
(2017) introduce a model with three components: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus, (2) 
hierarchical Bayesian inference, and (3) learning by value alignment, for understanding the structure and 
dynamics of moral learning (Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2017). Haas (2020) argues that 
sociological, psychological, and phenomenological features of moral cognition are results of interactions 
between various decision-making systems. Railton (2017) discusses conceptual foundations and 
normative relevance of moral learning using the recent advances in learning theory and neuroscience. 
For example, non-perspectival expected-value representations of agents and actions, ``afford a 
foundation for spontaneous moral learning and action that requires no innate moral faculty and can 
exhibit substantial autonomy with respect to community norms’’ (Railton 2017). Recent findings, on 
other hand, suggest that moral decision making for others is more model-free and has a specific neural 
signature (Lockwood, Klein-Flügge, Abdurahman, & Crockett 2020).  Dual process model of moral 
cognition, according to which two independent processes, namely, intuitions and conscious reasoning, 
lead to deontological and utilitarian decisions. The model assumes that moral dilemmas activate 
affective reactions resulting in a deontological moral judgment. However, given sufficient time, cognitive 
resources, and motivation, this immediate judgment can be reversed by more elaborate cognitive 
processing, resulting in utilitarian decisions, see, for example (Białek & De Neys 2017, Kroneisen & Heck 
2020), for some experimental work regarding dual process model of moral cognition. Kroneisen & Heck 
(2020) study the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian 
version of the CNI (Consequences, Norms, and Inaction) model.  
 
 
4. Digital me ethics  
 
4.1 General framework for digital me ethics  
 
As discussed in Section 2, the “real me” does not correspond to its digital me. Digital me is neither fully 
abstract (it is not a “perfect model” of real me), nor is fully concrete (it is not a digital embodiment of 
the real human agent who is considered a fully ethical agent). Real me cannot guarantee the actions, 
decision making and moral judgments of its digital me.  
 
We argue that a single real me is associated with an infinite series of digital me-s: dm(0), dm(1), dm(2),  
…, dm(∞), such that:    
 
1. dm(0) represents the raw data, 
2. dm(∞) represents the human (real me), and  
3. the series is inclusive meaning that for a given integer d, the set of properties modeled with the 
digital me dm(d), is guaranteed to have all properties modeled with dm(k) for all k from 0 to d-1.  
 
We assume that dm(∞) is infeasible, that is, a perfect model of real me cannot be developed (the 
perfect model of real me does not exist, or, all models of real me are wrong). In other words, digital me-
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s, dm(k) for all k < ∞, are formed out of the real me data, but they do not have the three necessary and 
sufficient conditions to be considered a fully ethical agent: consciousness, free will, and intentionality.  
 
However, we assume that there exists a number k* such that dm(k), for all k > k*, models mind 
properties of real me sufficiently good so that one can consider these digital me-s as having some 
(rudimentarily) form of  consciousness, free will, and intentionality, which could be called digital-
consciousness, digital-free-will, and digital-intentionality. Although we agree that humans are so far the 
only agents considered to be full ethical agents, we argue, however, that digital me could be considered 
as to-a-limited-extent fully ethical agent.  
 
Regarding four different levels of ethical agents, discussed in Section 3, depending on development and 
deployment of digital me-s (various companies could develop and deploy different digital me-s, even for 
a single person), digital me-s dm(k), with lower hierarchal levels (small k, even k=0), belong to the first 
two out of four levels, that is, ethical-impact agents and implicit ethical agents. In other words, only data 
representing digital me at the hierarchal level zero (k=0), although without any ethics explicitly 
implemented in it, has ethical impacts. In advanced models of real me, in digital me-s with higher 
hierarchal levels (larger k), we expect ethical premises and principles to be (or are already) directly 
implemented in their programming or reasoning process. Therefore, digital me-s with higher hierarchal 
levels (larger k) belong to the third level: explicit ethical agents. Several ethical principles that could be 
implemented in digital me-s are suggested in the Section 4.3.3. For values of k such that k > k*, it is 
assumed that models of mental properties of a real me (for example, model of the Big Five personality 
traits) are already incorporated and implemented. In this case, we argue that digital me-s belong to a 
sublevel of the fourth level, as they are not yet fully ethical agents, but only to-a-limited-extent fully 
ethical agents. 
 
The fields of moral learning and moral cognition are developing rapidly, both having a solid foundation 
in moral psychology and cognitive neuroscience, which can further improve the field of digital ethics, in 
particular, when implementing ethical principles in digital me-s. Therefore, the fundamentals of 
understanding, developing and deploying ethics in digital me-s, are consistent with understanding of the 
human brain and its structures and functions laying ground for morality. The question of how do we 
learn moral values and moral rules, and how can these learning models be adapted to create ethical 
digital me-s, is central one. As sciences and technologies advance, we envision that models of moral 
learning and moral cognition will be implemented in digital me-s. This will lead to digital me-s that can 
learn to be moral (as MuZero has learned to play games).  Let km be a value for which digital me-s are 
already equipped with moral learning capabilities. Digital me-s dm(k), for k > km , belong to the fourth 
level: fully ethical agents, as they develop their own moral attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, the 
question whether moral attitudes and behaviors of digital me-s dm(k) for k > km differ or not with those 
of the person they model/represent, is central one. In the following Section (4.2.) we discuss some of 
the consequences of potential ability of digital me-s to learn to be moral, including the question 
whether digital me-s could be more moral than humans, less moral than humans, or with possibility to 
develop an ethics altogether different from the human ethics.  
 
 
4.2. Digital Me metaethics  
 
We define digital me metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of concepts of digital me ethics. 
The idea is to explore the status, foundations, and scope of moral concepts for digital me agents. 
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Metaethics, defined as ``the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts’’ (Fieser), explores the 
status, foundations, and scope of moral concepts and terms by addressing various topics, two of which 
are central11: (1) metaphysical topics related to fundamental questions concerning the existence of 
morality independently of humans, and (2) psychological topics aiming to understand the psychological 
basis of our moral judgments and conduct (“What motivates us to be moral?”).  
 
Digital me metaethics has a major implication in redefining the first question of metaethics (does 
morality exists independently of humans), by the simple fact that digital me-s are agents capable of 
“learning to be moral”, without themselves being humans. The second question about the basis of moral 
judgements and conduct, however, has bigger consequences for the field of metaethics. The most 
important consequence of digital me-s ability to “learn to be moral” for metaethics consist of their 
potentiality to develop severely different ethics from human’s understanding of ethics, based on their 
status of immortal agents. By “digital me immortality” we qualify, as a minimum requirement, any agent 
which excels the duration of human life at least by twice. The UN global life expectancy for the world in 
2020 is 72.63 years (2020 data do not include any impacts of the Covid-19 virus), (Microtrends, 2020) 
therefore, any agent with longevity of at least 145.26 years, in this paper is considered as capable of 
developing ethics which differs from human’s understanding of ethics.  
 
We claim that humans’ understanding, development and execution of ethics largely rests upon 
principles which preserve lives for as long as biologically possible: absence of harm, presence of help 
and assistance, abstention from deceiving, respecting of the laws, of autonomy, dignity, etc. These 
principles shall acquire different meaning, once death is no longer possible for digital me-s. If digital me-
s cannot define survival as basic condition of life, this in turn will produce a strange paradox: digital me-s 
will no longer be able to be mortally wounded and “forever gone”, and at the same time, they will not 
be able to find a refuge in death, in case of a severe suffering, which they might be predestined to, by 
simply being sapient.  
 
The last point opens several important implications for the digital me meta-ethics:  
 
1. Digital me-s will encounter a form of “second death”, in the sense of the lost “ideal” of ethics, 
understood as “seeking the meaning” due to the finitude of life. In some instances, it can produce a 
development of digital me ethics based on “seeking death”, not just for the sake of avoiding endless 
suffering, but also in order to acquire “meaning”. Also, alongside digital me ethics, the concept of 
“meaning” will change. 
 
2. Digital me-s will be subjected to a forced choice: to reject immortality (in case they acquire such 
technical possibility) in order to retain the idea of symbolic life “in eternity”, and vice versa, to affirm the 
eternal life, with the risk to lose both: the proximity of life and the eternal passionate attachment to life.  
 
3. The relationship towards the dialectic of faith. The most common strive in humans consists of their 
desperate attempts to “escape” their faith (their biological fate, their lifestyles, their identity markers…), 
both for the sake of seeking the “sign”, either as the version of the miraculous proof of the creator’s 
existence, or in the name of searching for “meaning” (understood as non-metaphysical quest). What will 
this quest look like for digital me-s, and will their quest for “the creator” cease to exist, getting 
satisfaction just by Heidegger’s Being-there (Dasein)? Or will they develop a new ethics (we call it 
“Digital Being ethics”), aimed at seeking a proof that they are represented by something which is above 




4. The status of the “it for bit” doctrine. If an information is the core of the universe, will digital me-s 
(themselves, consisted also of information), stop searching for their “existence, function and meaning in 
the binary choices” - from bits? Or, will the digits in digital me-s, start seeking the meta-digits in the 
imagined meta-digital me-s, the metaphysical representations of themselves in the already mentioned 
Digital Being (with capital D)? If every item of the universe has at its core an immaterial source and 
explanation, will the ethics of future digital me-s, develop as ethics which seeks the “reality” based on 
the last analysis from the posing of “yes-no questions”, as their own version of the origins? 
 
5. The status of the death drive. If models of mental properties of a real me (the Big Five personality 
traits model) are incorporated and implemented, what will happen to what is inherent to human’s, the 
Freudian death drive - the hypothesis that there exists a teleological principle, that only because of the 
mortality and the need to preserve the continuation of life, an agent develops moral principles. Since we 
predict digital me-s will have all elements of an entire psychic life, it remains to be conceptualized how 
they will include the ethic’s most important element - the “human invention” of the so-called “enigmatic 
signifier”, a promise which explains the existence, explains the fate of “Being-there”, and forms basis for 
values and principles that guide sentient agents. 
 
4.3 Digital Me normative and applied ethics   
 
Normative ethics concerns practical issues and involves, in general terms, three topics: (1) virtue 
theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories. Virtue theories, by addressing the 
questions: “How should I live?”, “What is the good life?” and “What are proper family and social 
values?”, stress the role of character and virtue in moral philosophy. Duty theories (also called 
deontological theories) base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation, including rights 
theory, prima facie duties, and the theory developed by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of 
duty, called “categorical imperative.” Consequentialist theories focus on a cost-benefit analysis of an 
action’s consequences, for example, in utilitarianism, an action is morally right if the action’s 
consequences are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. 
 
Out of the two normative moral dilemmas: the relevant description of the moral rule, and the capacity 
to understand the moral rule – the second dilemma poses bigger challenge for the digital me normative 
ethics. It requires that digital me is equipped with “moral sensitivity”, “internalization of the moral 
salience”, and “the capacities to judge the nature of cases” (O’Neill, 2018). Humans, as fully ethical 
agents, naturally build this moral “sensitivity” with socialization, they are aware or attentive when the 
signs of “moral danger” appear, and they learn them by slow acquiring the knowledge of the world since 
childhood. For the humans it is generally accepted that the “rules of moral salience, are not moral rules, 
but a sort of moral early warning system,” meaning that even when humans are not yet applying the 
right moral choices, the warning moral signs, are still relevant as “pre-procedural moral rules” (O’Neill, 
2018). To acquire this moral sensitivity, the digital me-s should be capable of determining the judgement 
subsumes, for which they will require cognitive capacities. To understand the context of one’s action or 
duty, does not mean just solving a certain problem, but also humans describe an object, a situation or 
an act, as an attempt to “read the situation” in ethical terms. As stated in Section 4.1. this will be 
possible only for the digital me-s with higher hierarchal levels (larger k), and for values of k such that k > 
k*, where we assume that models of mental properties of a real me (model of the Big Five personality 
traits) are already incorporated and implemented, and in this case, digital me-s belonging to a sublevel 
of the fourth level of to-a-limited-extent fully ethical agent will have the necessary solution to the 




The most famous example of normative ethics is the so-called “categorical imperative”, founded by 
Immanuel Kant, and belonging to the so-called deontological normative ethics; the study of duty, or the 
duty-based ethics. In order to act in morally right way, Kant believed that an agent should act out of 
duty (“Do not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself”). There is a long tradition of 
interpretation of the categorical imperative, which is out of scope of this paper. We argue that for the 
digital me normative ethics, the higher hierarchal levels (larger k), the models of mental properties of a 
real me will be implemented, they will have the so-called “internal state” (its own desires, beliefs and 
other intentional states to act in a certain way), and the categorical imperative “do not do to other what 
you do not wish for yourself” will have approximately the same value as in humans (as fully ethical 
agents). In that case, the Kantian “categorical imperative” will have the same value regarding the 
difference between a) Determinant and reflective judgement (aiming to fit the world or some possible 
world) and b) Practical judgement, including ethical judgement (“aiming in some measure to shape the 
world, or to specify how it should be shaped” (O’Neill, 2018). It means that digital me-s could morally 
shape not just the “digital world”, but also the real world, and the interactions between the two.  
 
Here, however, we alarm of two different dangers related to digital me-s: a) the digital me-s being used 
as viruses (the possibility of digital me-s being produced and used for conquering parts of digital worlds, 
for digital or real world wars and warfare), and b) Multiplication and endless copying of digital me-s, 
which can have consequences in cases where the digital me can acquire different forms (clones) in order 
to gain, alter or differ the ethical outcomes from the ethical actions undertaken by different clone of the 
same digital me. 
 
Regarding the Digital me normative ethics, just for the purpose of this paper (and not with respect to 
different philosophical tradition regarding the Kantian normative ethics), we can make a general 
equation between the categorical imperative “Do not impose on others what you do not wish for 
yourself” with the so-called Golden Rule “Treat others as you would like to others to treat you”, as a 
maxim said to be found in some form in almost all ethical traditions since Confucianism to Buddhism, 
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Taoism, Zoroastrianism etc. and in most of the ethical systems 
and religions, regardless of the geographical, cultural and historical systems of humans (also signed in 
1993 as the so-called “Declaration Towards a Global Ethics” by 143 religious leaders (Towards a Global 
Ethics, 2018) existence, and should therefore be treated as a possible mayor Digital Me normative ethics 
maxim.  
 
The Golden Rule establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. However, when 
implementing the Golden Rule in digital me-s, we suggest a set of normative principles derived from the 
Golden Rule to be followed.  The first two principles are consequentialist: (1) Benefit of digital me: 
acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for the considered digital 
me and its corresponding individual; and (2) Benefit of digital me-s: acknowledge the extent to which an 
action produces beneficial consequences for other digital me-s and individuals. The next five principles 
are based on duties we have toward others: (1) Principle of benevolence: help entities, including digital 
me-s, in digital and physical worlds in need; (2) Principle of paternalism: assist entities, including digital 
me-s, in digital and physical worlds in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so themselves; 
(3) Principle of harm: do not harm digital me-s and individuals; (4) Principle of honesty: do not deceive 
digital me-s and individuals; and (5) Principle of lawfulness: digital me does not violate the law. Finally, 
the last three principles are based on moral rights: (1) Principle of autonomy: acknowledge the freedom 
of a digital me to act in digital and physical worlds; (2) Principle of justice: acknowledge the right of a 
digital me to due process, fair compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of benefits; (3) 
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